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INTRODUCfION 
Most of the analytical and empirical literature on income 
distribution has been concentrated on income inequality. In this paper we 
introduce efficiency considerations by means of social evaluation 
functions, taking advantage of some of the lessons learned in comparisons 
of income inequality over time and/or across space. 
We first summarise the framework of analysis presented in Ruiz­
Castillo (1994) to compare the social or aggregate welfare of independent 
cross-sections of household data on total income, expenditures on 
particular commodities, and non-income characteristics. In the second 
place, we propose a simple but useful statistical specification, which we 
then apply to Spanish data from two large household budget samples, of 
about 24.000 observations each, for a population of approximately 10 
million households occupying private housing: the Encuestas de 
Presupuestos Familiares (EPF from here on) for 1973-74 and 1980-81, 
collected by the Spanish lnstituto Nacional de Estadistica. 
If we allow households to have different preferences, we will be 
forced to establish a "welfare correspondence" in the sense of Pollak (1991), 
determining which indifference curve on one's household's map yields 
the same welfare level as a particular curve on each other's map. Lacking a 
theory for that purpose, we must restrict ourselves to what Pollak calls 
"situational comparisons". These are made in terms of a fundamental 
unconditional utility function, common to all households, defined on 
commodities and ethically relevant household characteristics. Then, 
following Muellbauer (1974) and standard practice since that date, we can 
adjust incomes for price change and non-income needs, taking as reference 
a vector of base prices and a household type. 
For the aggregation part we need a social evaluation function (SEF 
from here on) embodying all the relevant value judgements from an 
ethical point of view. Notice that the assumption of a common utility 
function only allows us to compare the household welfare of households 
of different characteristics, that is, to perform inter-household, not inter­
personal, welfare comparisons. Naturally, a different issue is whether in 
the domain of the SEF we should weight or not household equivalent 
income by household size, measured in terms of the number of equivalent 
adults or the number of persons in the household. 
We will accept the usual assumptions on SEFs: continuity, 
replication invariance and S-concavity, implying symmetry. The critical 
question is which other properties should we impose on admissible SEFs 
for empirical analysis. In the ethical approach to the measurement of 
inequality one would like to use a SEF to which one can associate, in a 
consistent way, only one inequality index. Furthermore, most welfare 
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analysis implicitly assume that social welfare can be expressed in terms of 
only two statistics of the income distribution: the mean, and a measure of 
inequality. As Dutta and Esteban (1991) have shown, to achieve these 
objectives we need to specify the type of mean-invariance property we 
want our inequality indices to satisfy. This is politically important, since 
we know from the early discussion in Kolm (1976a) that the choice of a 
mean-invariance class of inequality measures is not merely a technical 
matter, but a value laden question. Moreover, recent reports based on 
questionnaires indicate that people are by no means unanimous in their 
choice between relative, absolute or other intermediate notions of 
inequali tyO). Here, we will consider only the two polar cases of scale­
invariant (or relative) and translation-invariant (or absolute) inequality 
indices. 
We are interested in complete indicators which permit the 
decomposition of welfare changes into changes in the mean, and changes 
in either relative or absolute inequality. Also, we are interested in 
investigating which subgroups of the population experiment a welfare 
gain or a welfare loss during this period. Therefore, we will be using 
welfare measures which can be easily decomposed by population 
subgroups. This is particularly important for those characteristics which 
entail differences in household needs. Since any procedure for taking 
them into account is open to objections, it is mandatory that we look 
separately into each of the homogeneous subgroups with equal needs, and 
that we understand how alternative aggregation schemes produce a single 
scalar for the population as a whole. As we saw in Ruiz-Castillo (1994), this 
leads, in the relative case, to a SEF which is the product of the distribution 
mean and Theil's first index of equality and, in the absolute case, to the 
Kolm-Pollak family of SEFs. 
Pooling homogeneous subgroups together into a unique 
distribution requires a procedure to compare non-income needs across 
subgroups. But such a procedure affects also the evaluation within any 
homogeneous subgroup. As a matter of fact, in the absence of further 
restrictions on unconditional preferences, inequality within each subgroup 
depends on the value judgement implied in the choice of a reference type, 
say a single adult or a couple. The reason is that identical characteristics 
might be enjoyed differently depending on the income level. For instance, 
identical households might experience different economies of scale in 
consumption depending on their income level. To avoid this, and to 
expose the incidence of the choice of reference type on the within-group 
and between-group terms of the ethically relevant partition, we may 
assume that the adjustment procedure for taking into account non-income 
needs is independent of the utility level -an assumption originally 
introduced in the theoretical literature by Lewbel (1989) and Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1989) in the relative case, which was extended in Ruiz-Castillo 
(1994) to the absolute case. 
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For the empirical exercise, we will do without knowledge of the 
fundamental utility function. We concentrate on the case in which 
household size is the only characteristic determining non-income needs, 
although we also study the impact of weighting children differently than 
adults. Following Coulter et al (1992a, 1992b), we rely on ad hoc models of 
the weight to be given to household size and household composition. 
Here again, we must extend known methods in the literature on relative 
inequality to fit the absolute case. On the other hand, for the adjustment of 
money incomes to price change we use, as in Ruiz-Castillo (1993), 
household specific statistical price indices. Finally, like Slesnick (1991, 
1993), as far as the scale variable is concerned we propose to work with a 
measure of net h'ltal expenditures to approximate private household 
consumption, rather than total income. 
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. The first section 
presents the conceptual framework. The second section discusses the 
statistical specification. The third section contains the empirical results for 
the country as a whole, and for the partition by household size. The final 
section offers some concluding comments on the main empirical issues: i) 
the robustness of our estimates of welfare change to the choice of base 
prices and parameter values reflecting the weight to be given to household 
size and children relative to adults; ii) the decomposition of the change in 
real welfare into changes in the mean at constant prices, and changes in 
either relative or absolute real inequality; iii) the distributional impact of 
changes in relative prices; iv) the consequences of using different 
weighting schemes in the domain of the SEFs; and v) the decomposition 
of aggregate welfare by population subgroups, to learn about which 
ethically homogeneous subgroups gain or loose in real welfare. 
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I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1. The domain of the social problem 
Assume we have a heterogeneous population of H households, 
facing a common price vector p in R:, and let A be the set of household 
characteristics which give rise to ethically relevant differences in needs. 
Households may differ in income xh and/or a vector of characteristics ah 
in A. There can be a number M of different household types with 1 < M ~ 
H. Within each type rn, all households have identical characteristics: 
If M = H, then all households are different. 
We assume that there exists a common unconditional utility 
function U for all households, defined on commodities and 
characteristics, that is, on pairs (q, a) in R: x A. The indirect utility 
function and the cost function will be denoted, respectively, by 
u = <p(x, p, a) 
and 
x = c(u, p, a). 
In a given sample of utility maximising and price taking households, the 
observable data on prices, incomes, characteristics, and commodity 
demands for each h are related by 
uh =U(qh, ah) =<p(xh, p, ah) 
and 
h h hx = c(u ,p, a ). 
In an alternative interpretation, the fundamental preferences represented 
by U correspond to an agent in charge of aggregate evaluations. 
In income distribution theory we cannot treat symmetrically the 
vector of household incomes x = (xl, ... ,xH ), each component of which is 
supposed to serve different needs. We will attack this problem using a set 
of equivalence scales defined in terms of the cost function as follows: 
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If we take the reference household aO to consist of a single adult, the 
function d gives the number of equivalent adults in a household of 
characteristics ah who can enjoy the utility level u at prices p. For each h 
in the sample, define the adjusted, or equivalent. household income by 
This is the income necessary for a single adult to enjoy the utility level uh 
at prices p. Alternatively, we can define the compensation function 
which gives the income we can subtract from a household of 
characteristics ah for a single adult to enjoy the same utility level u at 
prices p with the remaining income. Then 
In our case, where we want to compare two heterogeneous 
populations confronting different price vectors in situations 't = 1, 2, we 
can express the two distributions at common prices using a true cost-of­
living index, say of the Paasche type, defined as follows: 
P(P't' Po; u, a) = c(u, P't' a)/c(u, Po' a). 
The function P compares the price vector in situation 't, p , with the vector
't 
of base prices Po at the utility level u for a household of characteristics a. 
Then, equivalent household income in situation 't will be: 
h h[ hh h h 
z = x /P(p, Po; u ,a ) d(a ,ao; Po' u )].
'to 't 't 't 't 't 
Alternatively, we can define the function 
P*(P't' Po; u, a) = c(u, P't' a) - c(u, Po' a), 
so that 
h h hh ha h h a 
z = x - P*(p, Po; u ,a ) - d*(a ,a; Pn' u ) = c(u 'Po' a ).
'to 't 't 't 't ' . 't 't 
Of course, for each h we have 
h h h h 
u = <p(x 'P't' a ) = <p(z 0' Po' a~,
't 't 't 't 
while for every pair of households h, k, we have 
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h k h 0 k 0 h k 
z ~ z ~ c(u , Po' a ) ~ c(u , p , a ) ~ u ~ u ;
to to t t t t 
that is, the income adjusted for price change and non-income needs 
provides a comparable indicator of household welfare. 
1.2. Properties of the social evaluation function 
A Social Evaluation Function (SEF) is a real valued function W 
defined in the space RH of adjusted or equivalent incomes, with the 
interpretation that for each income distribution z = (zl , ... ,zH), W(z) 
provides the "social" or, simply, the aggregate welfare from a normative 
point of vie\-\'. We know that only under very stringent conditions on U 
the social evaluation process will be independent of prices(2) or 
characteristics. Therefore, in practice we must confront two index number 
problems: the choice of a price vector Po' and the choice of a reference type 
aD. 
Which properties should we impose on the admissible class of 
SEFs? What we call the standard model for welfare analysis is 
characterised by a minimal axiom set on W, covering both a relative and 
an absolute concept of inequality: A.1 S-concavity; A.2 continuity; A.3 
population replication invariance; pI us AAR weak-homotheticity and 
A.5R monotonicity along rays from the origin, in the relative case; or 
AAA weak-translability and A.5A monotonicity along rays parallel to the 
line of equality, in the absolute case. Under these conditions, there exists a 
unique function V such that 
W(z) = V(~(z), I(z», 
where ~ is the function giving the mean, I an index of relative or absolute 
inequality, and V is increasing in its first argument and decreasing in its 
second argument. Notice that, in this model, transfers which preserve the 
mean of equivalent incomes will generally require changes in the mean of 
unadjusted incomes. We believe that this should cause no particular 
concern, since the latter is not the distribution ethically relevant in the 
inhomogeneous case(3). 
We are interested in complete quantitative assessments of welfare 
change in real terms, and its decomposition into changes in the mean at 
constant prices and changes in either relative or absolute real inequality. 
For that purpose, we have to be more specific about the trade-off between 
efficiency and distributional considerations. It suffices to indicate that any 
homothetic SEF can be expressed as the product of the mean and the so 
called AKS equality index: 
W(x) = ~(x) [1 - IAKS(x)] = ~(x) EAKS(x), 
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while any translatable SEF can be expressed as the difference between the 
mean and the KBD inequality index: 
W(x) = ll(x) - IKBD(x). 
These are inequality indices derived from W using the EDEI (equally­
dis tribu ted-equivalen t-income)(4). 
For any partition of the population, we are also interested in 
welfare measures capable of distinguishing -in a convenient additive way­
between two components: welfare within the subgroups, and the loss of 
welfare due to inequality between the subgroups. Which homothetic or 
translatable SEF should we use for that purpose? There are different ways 
to decompose a summary statistic like an inequality or a welfare index to 
achieve this practical aim. The following two are the best known and will 
permit to single out the SEFs to be used in this study. 
Consider the unweighted distribution of household equivalent 
income and, in the first place, define between-group inequality as the 
inequality remaining after removing all within-group inequality by 
assigning each household her subgroup mean, that is, the inequality of the 
distribution ll* = (lll,· ..,IlM) where, for each m, 
Then, one investigates under what conditions overall inequality can be 
expressed as 
(1) 
where the weights am are functions only of the set of subgroup means and 
sizes. Let us denote by T the function giving the total income of a 
distribution. If the weights in the above expression are subgroup shares in 
total income, i.e. 
and we choose a multiplicative trade off between the mean and the 
equality index, that is, a SEF W such that 
W(z) = ll(z)E(z), 
then we have 
This is a useful expression, indicating that aggregate welfare can be 
expressed as a weighted average of the welfare within each subgroup, with 
weights equal to population shares, minus the between-group inequality 
according to method I, weighted by the population mean. Although all the 
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members of the General Entropy family of relative inequality indices 
admit the decomposition of equation 0), only the first Theil index IT has 
the required properties so that 
Blackorby, Donaldson and Auersperg (981) define between-group 
inequality as the inequality that would result if each household received 
her subgroup's EDEI ~m. The separability conditions required to estimate 
the EDEI of any subgroup in any partition independently of the rest of the 
distribution, combined with assumptions A.I, A.2, and A.SA for a 
translatable W, lead to the Kolm-Pollak family: 
where y is interpreted as an aversion to inequality parameter: as y 
increases, the social indifference curves show increasing curvature until 
only the income of the poorest person matters. The KBD index of absolute 
inequality consistent with Wy is 
A/z) = [1/y] In I (1 /H)Lh e y (Il(z) - zh)], y> O. 
Since 
,,,,here 
'":>
):.*_(~1 M) ~n1_():.( 
-
m)lHm)
, 
-1
-
M 
,- '":> ,.", ,~ '":> Z. n1 ,,,., 
we have 
This is an appealing decomposition, in which social welfare is seen to be 
equal to the weighted average of the aggregate welfare ,,,,ithin each of the 
subgroups, with weights equal to population shares, minus the inequality 
between the subgroups according to method 11. 
1.3. An special assumption on preferences 
Suppose we have M < H homogeneous subgroups with identical 
characteristics. As pointed out in the Introduction, in general inequality of 
the unadjusted distribution within a homogeneous subgroup will differ 
from inequality of the adjusted distribution depending on whether we 
take one adult or a couple as reference type. To avoid this, and to expose 
the incidence of the choice of reference type on the within-group and 
between-group terms of the ethically relevant partition, we may assume 
that the adjustment procedure for taking into account non-income needs 
is independent of the utility level. Then, in the relative case preferences 
must be restricted as follows(S): 
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c(u, p, a) = Hu, p) g(p, a), 
in which case 
where for each rn 
In the absolute case, the function d* is independent of utility levels 
if, and only if, preferences are restricted as follows: 
c(u, p, a) = f*(u, p) + g*(p, a). 
Then, the decomposition of the Kolm-Pollak family will be: 
where for each m 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the assumption of a common 
utility function only allows us to compare the household welfare of 
households of different characteristics. This presents a problem, since in 
welfare economics we are mostly interested in personal welfare. 
However, without abandoning the present framework, we can extend the 
domain of the SEF ,veighting each household h by the scalar ~h: 
W(Zl, ... , zl, ,zH,oo., zH).00. 
___ ~ L__ _ ~H----
Lacking ethical reasons to discriminate within types, ,ve will restrict 
ourselves to the case in which all households of the same type rn, receive 
the same weight ~m. It is worth while pointing out that under the 
restriction we are discussing, in the relative case transfers which preserve 
the mean of equivalent incomes do not require changes in the mean of 
unadjusted incomes if, and only if, 
Thus, transfers of equivalent income between households of the same 
subgroup will preserve the mean of unadjusted incomes. This will 
happen for the population as a whole whenever the weights are the 
number of equivalent adults, Le., 'whenever ~h = d(ah, aO) for all h. In the 
absolute case, transfers which preserve the mean of equivalent incomes 
will not require changes in the mean of unadjusted incomes if, and only 
if, ~h = ~k. Hence, total unadjusted income ,vill be constant after the 
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transfer within homogeneous subgroups and, for the population as a 
whole, only in the unweighted case. 
In empirical applications, we recommend experimenting with 
different weighting schemes, regardless of the impact of transfers of 
equivalent income on the unadjusted distribution. For that purpose, let v 
= (v1,... ,vM ) be the distribution where adjusted incomes are weighted by 
the number of household members, sh (6), and assume that all 
households of type m have the same number sm. Then, the welfare 
measure in the relative case becomes 
* WT(v) = Lm[Sm/S][WT(xm)/d(am, aD)] - ~(v)IT(Jlv)' 
where Srn= mH m is the number of persons of type m, and S = LmSm. 
Similarly, in the absolute case we have 
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11. THE STATISTICAL SPECIFICATION 
11.1. The scale variable 
For reasons spelled out in Ruiz-Castillo (1993), we prefer to use 
household total expenditure as an estimate of private total consumption 
as our scale variable, rather than total income. In this, we follow Slesnick 
(1991, 1993) who has made a strong case in favor of consumption as the 
best proxy for the standard of living. One mayor may not agree with this 
choice, but we can be certain that results using household income will be 
very different indeed. 
In our surveys, the concept of total expenditure includes transfers 
made by the household, as well as a number of imputations for 
consumption and wages in kind, subsidized meals at work, and a market 
rental value, estimated by the owner, for owner-occupied housing. 
However, our experience with the 1980-81 EPF indicates that 
discontinuous household expenditures on some durables, whose 
occurrence may distort heavily the total, are best considered investment 
rather than consumption. These include current acquisitions of cars, 
motorcycles and other means of private transportation, as well as house 
repairs financed by either tenants or owner-occupiers. Thus, our estimate 
h 
of household current consumption, x , will be total household 
't 
expenditures, net of these investment items(7). 
In should be noticed that we have used the information on 
blowing up factors provided by INE. Thus, ours are not sample estimates 
but blown up estimates for the total population. 
11.2. The treatment of heterogeneous households 
The estimation of equivalence scales along with the usual price 
and income effects under the assumption of a single unconditional 
preference ordering, is plagued with a number of well known difficulties, 
even under the simplifying restriction on preferences discussed in the 
previous section(8). As Coulter et al. (1992a) conclude, there is no 
"correct" set of scales and searching for some would possibly be 
misguided. Thus, they suggest two immediate alternatives(9) which we 
have pursued already in Ruiz-Castillo (1993). In the first place, if one 
insists in pooling people of different characteristics by means of some 
equivalence scales, then robustness should be checked by estimating 
welfare for different values of the key parameters which determine the 
scales. In the second place, we can always study each homogeneous 
household type separately and then use welfare measures additively 
] ] 
decomposable by population subgroup to minimize the impact of 
"inappropriate" scale relativities. 
In most of this paper, we will consider the simplest case in which 
the only ethically relevant characteristic is the number of household 
members sh and the reference type is a household consisting of a single 
adult, so that sa = 1. Moreover, the functions d and d* will be independent, 
not only of the utility level, but also of the price vector(lO). 
In the relative case preferences will be parametrised as follows: 
so that
 
d(sh, sa; u, p) = (sh)8,
 
and
 
h h h 8 
z (8) =x /(s ) ,h =Lt,. .. ,H't, 
'to 'to 't 
When 8 = 0, equivalent income coincides with unadjusted household 
income, while if 8 = I, it equals per capita household income. In the 
absolute case, preferences \-\'ill be paranletrised by 
du, p, sh) = f*(u, p) + Ash, AE [O,A*], 
so that 
and 
h h h 
z (A) = x - A(s - I), h = l't, ...,H ,tto 'to 't 
The parameter Acan be interpreted as the cost of an adult. As we shall see, 
the upper bound for A, as well as the values for the aversion to inequality 
parameter "(, must be jointly selected taking into account that absolute 
inequali ty measures are not independent of the measurement unit. 
Under these simplifying assumptions, aggregate welfare in 
si tuation 't for the unweighted distributions -in terms of the partition in 
which m is the number of household members- will be, in the relative 
case, 
where for each m 
IJ.m(8) = [IJ.~ /m8 ] IHm. 
't 't
 
In the absolute case,
 
1 2 
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m •
wfz't('A» = Lm [H'tm/H't]W/x't) - Lm [H'tn/H't]'A(m -1) - A/Sr('A», 
where for each m 
m m H ~ ('A) =[~ - 'A(m - 1)] 1 m.
't x't 
The expressions for other weighting schemes and other partitions need 
not be given here. 
Finally, we will consider the case in which adults and children 
may receive different consideration(ll). In particular, we will study the 
convenient parametrisation in which "effective household size" is seen to 
be equal to 
h h
where sA and se are the number of adults and children in household h, 
and II is a parameter. Then, in the relative case we will have 
h h h h 8 
z (8,11) = x / «sA + II se) ,
'to 'to 
while in the absolute case 
h h h h 
z ('A,ll) = x - 'A(sA + II se - 1). 
'to 'to 
This two parameter specification will be contrasted with the OECD scale in 
which efficient household size is equal to 
h h
1 + 0.7 (sA - 1) + 0.5 (se)' 
11.3. Repricing the scale variable
 
Under the above assumptions ",'e have
 
or 
h h hh h) =xx =x - P*(p P . u a - [f*(uh P ) - f*(u h P )].
'to 't 't' 0" 't ' 't 0I 
Changes in real welfare, in terms of changes in the mean and changes in 
distribution, will be given by 
~Wro(8) = Wr (z2o(8»/Wr (zlO(8) 
= [1l(z2o(8»/Il(zlO(8)] [Er (z2o(8»/Er (zlO(8)] =~llo(8MEro(8) 
and 
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~W1lA) = [Wfz20(A» - WfZlO(A)]/WfZlO(A) 
= [1l(Z20(A» -1l(ZlO(A)]/Wy...ZlO(A) - [AjZ20(A» -Af,ZlO(A)l/WfZlO(A) 
= ~1l0(A) + ~E~(A). 
We will consider the two polar cases Po =P2 and Po =PI. Notice that there 
need not be any relationship between ~1l2(e) and ~1l1 (8), or between 
~ET2(e) and ~ET1 (8). Therefore, there is no a priori reason to expect 
~WT2(e) greater or smaller than ~WT1(e). Similarly, nothing can be said a 
priori about ~Wy2(A) relatively to ~W'Yl(A). 
Rather than estimating the functions f or f" to construct P or p.., 
we will express the various distributions in comparable money units of 
the same time period by means of household specific price indices, in 
whose construction we used a system of official price indices which has 
1976 as the base year. Since we have monthly price data from 1976 
onwards, and we know the quarter during which each household of the 
second survey was interviewed, it is possible to select one of them, namely 
Winter 1981, as situation 2. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the first 
survey: we only have annual price data from 1960 to 1975, and we do not 
have information about the time structure of the survey during the span 
July 1973 to June 1974. Therefore, situation 1 is taken to be the average of 
1973 and 1974. 
As reported in Higuera and Ruiz-Castillo (1991), to compare a price 
vector in a given year t with prices in the base year 1976 for a household h, 
we estimated individual indices of the type 
h 
where w. is the share of total expenditure devoted to commodity j by
Jt 
household h in the survey year t, I jt is the official price index for commodity 
j in year t. For the period after 1976, data is available for 58 commodities, 
while for the period before that date we can only distinguish between 5 
commodity groupings. To express a given distribution -for instance the 
distribution xI- in money terms of a year 0, we need individual Paasche type 
indices based on situation 1. These are easily constructed as follows: 
where
 
PI = (1/2) P73 + (1/2) P74·
 
Then, the repriced distribution will be 
14 
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h h # h 
YlO = "I /P (PI' Po; W1 ). 
for h = 1,..., 24.151. Similarly, the repriced distributions for the second 
survey data will be 
for h = 1,... , 23.952, where P2 = Winter 81. 
For base prices Po' let us denote our estimates by 
and 
I1W~(A) = WfY20(A» - WfYIO(A) = 111l~(A) + I1E~(A). 
Of course, a statistical Paasche price index provides only a lower bound to 
the true cost-of-living construction, Le. 
# h h hP (PI' Po; w1 ) ~ P(Pt' Po; u ,a ). 
Therefore, for all hand t = 1, 2, we have 
h h
 
YtO ~ \0'
 
Hence, for all E> and A, when Po = P2 (po = PI) our estimates 111l~(E» and 
I1Il~CA) provide a lower (upper) bound for 111l0(E» and 111l0(A), respectively. 
On the other hand, if the substitution bias is greater for the rich, as can be 
expected, and the change in relative prices from PI to P2 is less damaging to 
the poor than to the rich, as we know to be the case for Spain in this 
period, then when Po = P2 (po = PI)' I1E;o(E» and I1E~(A) provide an upper 
(lower) bound for I1E10(E» and I1E)(lCA), respectively. Therefore, nothing 
definite can be said in our case about the nature of the approximation of 
our estimates I1W~o(E» and I1W~(A) to the true values of I1W10(E» and 
11Wyo(A), respectively. 
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Ill. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We will address the following questions for the population as a 
whole: 1. How does the measurement of real welfare according to WT(S) 
vary with S and the choice of Po for the unweighted distributions of 
household equivalent expenditure? 2. How does the measurement 
according to WyO.) vary with A, yand the choice of Po for those same 
distributions? 3. What is the distributional impact of changes in relative 
prices? 4. What qualifications should be introduced if we estimate a two 
parameter model involving household size and the distinction between 
adults and children? 5. Finally, we will study each homogenous subgroup 
in the crucial partition by household size. 6. At this point it will be easy to 
understand the consequences of weighting household adjusted 
expenditures by household size. 
1. The parameter S, representing the weight given to household 
size in the relative case, takes on the values 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0. 
Under our assumptions, 
J,1(y(S» =!:m[Hm/H][J,1(xm)/mE1. 
Therefore, the mean is a decreasing function of S. On the other hand, in 
Spain, like in the U.K., we saw in Ruiz-Castillo (1993) that relative equality 
follows an inverted U pattern. As we see in Table 1, WT(Yto(S» turns out 
to be decreasing with S at both PI and P2 in both surveys. 
More interestingly, we observe that, at P2' there has been an 
improvement in real mean, real equality and, hence, real welfare. At PI 
increases in real equality barely offsets losses in real mean. To see this, 
recall that the decomposition of changes in real welfare at base prices Po is 
given by 
where the symbol # indicates ratio comparisons. Thus, for instance, at Po = 
P2 
The information is in the upper part of Table 2 and the patterns in 
percentage terms for the three concepts, as a function of S, are shown in 
the left-hand panel of Figure 1. 
The main conclusions are that i) the improvement in real welfare 
is remarkably stable as a function of S, and ii) there is a considerable 
difference between choosing PI or P2 as the reference price vector. Taking 
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into account that ~Jl~ and ~E;2 provide a lower (upper) bound to the 
corresponding true values at prices P2' we may say that, for an 
intermediate value of 8, there has been an improvement in real mean at 
least as large as 2%, an improvement in real equality at most equal to 
5.5%, and an improvement in real welfare of about 7%. At prices PI' there 
has been a loss in real mean at least as large as 3.5%, an improvement in 
equality at least as large as 5%, and a negligible improvement in real 
welfare at most equal to 1.5%. 
2. The parameters y and A have to be chosen taking into account 
that the measurement of absolute inequality depends on the units in 
which household expenditure is measured. We have selected parameter 
values so as to achieve a wide range of variation of the ratio of absolute 
inequality to the distribution mean. The results for the unweighted 
distributions in both survey years are in Tables 3 and 4 for PI and P2' 
respectively. For instance, at prices P2 and A =0, absolute inequality in 
situation 2 represents less than 1%, more than 30%, and more than 50% of 
the mean when the aversion to inequality parameter y is set up, 
respectively, at 5.10-7, 5.10-6, and 10-5 (12). These percentages are greater for 
the 1973-74 distribution. 
On the other hand, recall that Acan be interpreted as the cost of an 
adult. At P2' the upper bound for Ahas been fixed at 90.000 pesetas, which 
is 35% of the mean of per capita household expenditures in 1980-81, or 
close to per capita household expenditure for very large units consisting 
of more than 10 members. Given the selection of y's already mentioned, 
values of Abeyond 90.000 lead to negative welfare estimates which are 
difficult to interpret. At PI' household adjusted expenditures are smaller 
than at P2 by a factor greater than 3. Correspondingly, we have fixed the 
upper bound for Aat 30.000 pesetas. The ratios of absolute inequality to the 
mean at different values of Aare considerably lower than at P2' indicating 
that y values -which are kept at 5.10-7, 5.10-6, and 10-5 for comparison 
purposes- are perhaps too small for distributions expressed at this 
measurement unit. 
At any rate, absolute inequality decreases with Amost of the time. 
However, as can be seen in the left hand panel of Figure 2 for the 
unweighted distributions, for high values of yabsolute inequality for both 
survey years at P2 first decreases and then increases as Aapproaches its 
upper bound. Such curvature is less pronounced at PI' Nevertheless, at 
both P2 and PI (right hand panel of Figure 2), there is an improvement in 
absolute inequality at all values of y. Such an improvement is greater the 
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smaller the aversion to inequality, and in all cases suffers small variations 
as a function of A. 
Of course, as we see in Table 3 and 4, in all survey years the mean 
is a decreasing function ofA. In real terms, there is an increase of 1-2 % at 
P2' but a decrease of about 4.5-5.5% at PI' The joint impact on welfare of 
changes in absolute inequality and changes in the mean at base prices PO' is 
judged by 
L\ W§ (A) =L\Jl§ (A) + L\E§ (A), 
"fJ "fJ "fJ 
where the symbol § indicates percentage differences relative to the welfare 
in situation 1. Thus, for instance, at Po = P2 
Numerical estimates of this decomposition for y =5.10-6 are in Table 5, 
while Figure 3 provides a graphical representation for all y. 
The .main conclusions are that: i) at every value of A, the change in 
real welfare tends to be greater the greater the aversion to absolute 
inequality. ii) For every value of y, the change in real welfare increases 
slightly as a function of A, exploding at high values of yand Aas a 
consequence of large increases in inequality, partly induced by large 
increases in the mean(l3). iii) At any rate, as in the relative case, the results 
vary considerably depending on whether real change is expressed at P2 or 
PI' We might say that, at P2 there has been an increase in real welfare of 
about 3.5-10.0%, depending on the choice of Aand y. Between 2.0-6.5% of 
such an increase should be attributed to an improvement in absolute 
inequality, and the rest to a slight improvement in the mean. At PI' the 
estimates for the change in real welfare vary from a decrease of about 3.5% 
to an improvement of 2%, depending on A and y. This is the result of a 
relatively large loss in the mean in the range 4.5-8.0%, partially offset by an 
improvement in absolute inequality of 1.0-9.0%. 
3. That intertemporal comparisons of welfare require an 
adjustment for price change is, of course, widely recognised. However, 
researchers often correct the original distributions with a single measure 
of price change for all households(l4). We have done that taking into 
account the 322% inflation rate, measured by the official price index, 
between situations 1 and 2. Notice that now, in the relative case 
and 
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The last expression is the change in money equality. Estimates appear in 
Tables 1,2 and Figure 1 under the p "" heading. 
We see that, in both the unweighted and the weighted cases, the 
change in real welfare at p "" as a function of e is not that different from the 
change estimated at pz. However, as far as the reasons for it, estimates at p "" 
tell the wrong story: a large improvement in the mean and a relatively 
small improvement in money inequality. Because the change from PI to 
pz has damaged the standard of living of the rich more than that of the 
poor, what has happened in Spain during this period is exactly the 
opposite: a relatively small increase in the mean, but a considerable 
improvement in real inequality. 
The information for the absolute case is in Tables 4 and 5, as well 
as in Figure 3, also under the p "" heading. At an intermediate value of y, for 
instance, the picture is very similar: i) welfare change at p"" is of the same 
order of magnitude than at pz. iD However, the mean effect is exagerated at 
the expense of the improvement in inequality. As a matter of fact, at high 
Avalues and high mean increments we observe an inexistent loss in 
absolute inequality. 
4. In the model where adults and children are treated differently 
according to the specification 
h h 
sA + T) SC' T)E (o,ll, 
we have compared previous results, in which T) =1, with the following 
values for T): 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25. The estimation of the full grid for the two 
parameter models -(8, T) and (A, T)- in the relative and the absolute cases, 
respectively, in the unweighted case at pz, are available upon request. 
Here, to begin with, in the upper part of Figure 4 we show how the 
measurement of relative equality according to ET varies with e and T) for 
the unweighted distribution YIZ' i. e., the 1973-74 distribution at prices of 
situation 2. 
As predicted in Jenkins and Cowell (1993), i) when El is low (s 0.4), 
variations in T) have a negligible impact on equality: as a function of T) the 
corresponding curves are very flat (upper left hand side of Figure 4), while 
as a function of 8 they are very close together (upper right hand side of 
that Figure). Also iD the inverse-V pattern implied by e variations are less 
pronounced when T) is relatively low. At any rate, for each household size, 
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decreases in " raise the equivalent expenditures of larger households 
relative to those of smaller households; given the negative covariance 
between number of children and total household expenditure, there is an 
equalising impact. The gross grid we have investigated does not allow us 
to see whether there is a non-monotonic relationship of the type detected 
by Jenkins and Cowell (1993) at low values of" . 
Since we find sufficient stability in shape for other distributions, 
we end here the report for single cross-sections. Furthemore, we are 
mostly interested in trends. The lower part of Figure 4 shows the change in 
relative equality and welfare at P2' We observe that the improvement in 
real equality is uniformly smaller as the weight given to children 
decreases. The impact on the mean (not shown) goes in the opposite 
direction. The net result is that, at every value of e, the improvement in 
real welfare increases as " decreases. However, the magnitude of the 
impact is very small indeed. 
To complete this study of the sensitivity of our results to different 
models for taking into account demographic factors, we have considered 
the so-called DECD equivalence scale, widely used internationally, 
including the Spanish INE. It gives a unit weight to the first adult -a 
person 14 or more years old- 0.7 to each additional adult, and 0.5 to every 
person less than 14 years old. Estimates in Tables 1 and 2 and graphical 
representations in Figure 4 are refered to by the symbol DECD. 
We see that, for the individual cross-sections, the DECD estimate 
corresponds to a low value of e -and hence any value of,,- or a high value 
of both e and ". For the change in real welfare in the unweighted case at 
P2' the DECD estimate corresponds to the choice (S,,,) = (0.8, 0.25); that is, 
to counting children at half what the DECD suggests, but admitting 
considerable economies of scale in consumption. This result is robust to 
changes in the reference price vector and in the weighting scheme. 
Being scale independent, relative inequality measurement is not 
affected by the fact that as the weight given to children decreases, the mean 
of any adjusted distribution increases at all values of A. However, the 
situation in the absolute case, as we see for example in Figure 5, is rather 
different: because the mean is changing, absolute inequality at P2 and an 
intermediate value of y increases uniformly as a function of ", in spite of 
the fact that relative inequality decreases as" goes down. 
As far as the trend is concerned, under Figure 5 parameter values 
the improvement in absolute inequality at all values of Ais smaller, the 
smaller is ". As a percentage of welfare in situation I, we see also that such 
an improvement losses importance as children are given, a smaller 
weight. Since the same happens to the change in the mean (not shown), 
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the increase in real welfare at P2 and y =5.10-6 gets reduced at every Aas 11 
goes down. Of course, as in the relative case, these effects are quite 
negligible at low Avalues. As a matter of fact, except for Avalues close to 
its upper bound, the impact of varying the importance of children relative 
to adults on mean, absolute inequality and welfare change is less than 2%. 
The OECD practice losses some of its meaning in the absolute case: 
the induced changes in the mean at either Pt or P2' precludes comparisons 
of absolute inequality with or without the OECD convention. As we can 
see at Tables 3 and 4, essentially both the OECD mean and the OECD 
absolute inequality are much lower than their counterparts at all values of 
A and 11. On the other hand, at P2 the improvement in the mean is rather 
large, while the improvement in absolute inequality is very small or 
negative at high Avalues (see Table 5 and Figure 3). The net result is a 
very small increase in real welfare, well below the corresponding to the (A, 
11) model. At Pt one gets the same qualit~tive results. 
5. We have reviewed the main results when all households are 
pooled into a single distribution by means of one- or two-parameter 
models. It is time to look into the fundamental partition by household 
size. The results for each individual subgroup, as well as their relative 
demographic importance, are in Tables 6 and 7 for the relative and the 
absolute case, respectively. 
Starting with the relative case, there are three groups to consider. 
We will begin with households consisting of 3- to 7-members which 
repersent, approximately, two thirds of all households and 80% of all 
persons. They experience a relatively small or no improvement in the 
mean at constant prices and some improvement on relative equality. As a 
consequence, their real welfare goes up by about 4.5-5% at P2' or goes down 
by about 1.5% at Pt' Next, there are two tails to study with opposite 
fortunes. Households of 1 or 2 persons -28% of all households and 13% of 
all persons- combine a large increase in both mean and relative equality, 
and therefore a large increase in real welfare. The remaining 3% of all 
households but 7.5 of all persons, consisting of 8 or more persons, 
experience losses in the mean, little or no change in real equality and 
considerable losses in real welfare, of about 7 to 13% depending on 
whether we look at P2 or Pt, respectively. 
In the absolute case, we have to be careful again with the 
interaction between the measurement of inequality and the unit of 
measurement. Except for 1 and 3 person households, all groups 
experiment an improvement in inequality. However, large increases 
(decreases) in the mean for small (large) households pushes down (up) 
changes in absolute inequality. This is of course compatible with larger 
improvements in relative inequality for small households. Nevertheless, 
as in the relative case, the net result is a 3 group breakdown at the welfare 
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level: at P2' for example, we observe considerable increases for 1 and 2 
person households, smaller ones for the majority of the population 
consisting of 3 to 7 members, and a welfare loss for very large households. 
6. Let us turn now towards a better understanding of how the 
aggregation exercise is performed on top of the changes experienced by 
individual subgroups. At base prices Po' in the relative case for 
unweighted distributions, aggregate welfare change can be decomposed in 
three terms: 
where: 
F(8) =l:m[H~ /Hl][~WT(Xm)/m8], 
D(8) =~m [MJ1 WT(X~ )/m~, MJ1 =HT/H - H~/Hl,2 
* * B(8) =- [1l(Y20(8»)Il(1l (8» -1l(YlO(8»)Il(1l (8»].20 1O
Dividing up each subgroup's welfare change by a factor m 8 gives a greater 
weight to smaller households in F(8), the more so the greater is 8. Also, 
weighting this ratio by household demographic shares favors smaller 
households. 
It turns out that the importance of terms D(e) and B(e) is not 
large. Therefore, the differences between the unweighted and the weighted 
case are mainly explained by the F(8) term. Given the subgroup differences 
we have already reviewed, it is easy to see that F(e) will be smaller when 
households are weighted by household size. The results are reported at the 
bottom of Table 2 and the right hand panel in Figure 1. 
We observe that, as in the unweighted case, i) the improvement in 
real welfare is stable as a function of e, and ii) there is a considerable 
difference between choosing PI or P2 as the reference price vector. Overall, 
at P2 and at an intermediate e value, the welfare improvement is only 
about 5% -versus 7% in the unweighted case- while at PI we may have a 
welfare loss of about 1-2% -versus a small gain of about 1.5% in the 
unweighted case. 
In the absolute case, the analogous decomposition is the following: 
where: 
Ey =l:m[H~ /HI][~Wfxm)], 
Dy =~m [~rn WfX~ )], 
DO..) =A[ (51 /H l ) - (5/H2), 
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Again, weighting the welfare change within each group by household 
shares in Fy' favors smaller households. Given that the adjustment term 
D y' as well as the sum of D(A) and By(A) are of a smaller order of 
magnitude for all A and y, differences between the unweighted and the 
weighted case are mainly explained by the F term. The results for an 
intermediate value of yare reported at the bottom of Table 5. 
We observe that, at P2' welfare increases vary from 6.5 to 9.3% as a 
function of y -versus 8.6 to 12.8% in the unweighted case- while at Pl' 
welfare losses go from 1.4 to 2.9% -versus a variation in the interval (+0.3, 
-0.3) in the unweighted case. 
Finally, since the average household size in situation 1 is slightly 
greater than in situation 2, the expression between brackets in D(A) is 
positive. Thus, this term increases with A. On the other hand, there is an 
improvement for all A in the between-group component of absolute 
inequality from 1973-74 to 1980-81, so that ByCA) is positive. Because such 
an improvement is smaller the larger is A, D(A) and BfA) do not reinforce 
each other. Hence, as we saw in point 2 of this Section, welfare change in 
the absolute case is quite robust to the choice of parameter A. 
23 
11---
II
\1 
!II, 
I1 
11 
I' 
1\ 
11 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have investigated the evolution of the standard of 
living in Spain from 1973-74 to 1980-81 for a population of about 10 
million household and 34 or 37 million persons occupying private 
housing. The standard of living has been approximated by a private 
consumption measure: total household expenditures, net of certain 
investment items. Comparisons in real terms have been made possible by 
household specific statistical consumer price indices, constructed on a 57-
dimensional commodity space. The heterogeneity of the household 
population has been taken into account by means of several 
parametrisations of the weight to be given to household size, or to 
children needs relative to those of adults. 
Social or aggregate evaluations have been performed by scalar 
indicators which permit to summarise judgements about an entire 
distribution by means of two statistics: the mean and an index of either 
relative or absolute inequality. Standard restrictions, as well as the 
requirement of additive separability, lead to a member of the General 
Entropy family of social evaluation functions in the relative case, and to 
several members of the Kolm-Pollack family in the absolute case. 
Comparisons have been made with and without weighting household 
adjusted expenditure by household size in the domain of the social 
evaluation functions. 
During the study period, right after the first oil crisis and in the 
middle of a radical political change in Spain, the Spanish economy was not 
in good shape: GNP grew only at an average annual rate of about 2.3% at 
constant prices of 1986, while according to the official CPI the general price 
level increased 322%. As far as the evolution of the standard of living, our 
main conclusions are the following: 
1. According to our budget surveys, mean household expenditure 
increased about 2% at prices of situation 2 (Winter 1981), or decreased at 
least 3.5% at prices of situation 1 (an average of 1973 and 1974 prices). 
2. This fundamental change has not been distributed uniformly 
across groups. Under the assumption that households of the same size are 
readily comparable because they have the same needs from a social point 
of view, we concentrate on the partition by household size. We observe 
that households of 1 or 2 persons enjoy a considerable increase in the 
mean even at PI; a majority of the population consisting of households 
from 3 to 7 persons experience a slight increase at P2 or a slight decrease at 
PI; the remaining of the population, consisting of large households, 
experience large losses. 
3. Relative inequality has improved for all subgroups at both price 
regimes, but the ordering by household size according to the magnitude of 
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such improvement is the same as before. Hence, at P2 small households 
end up with welfare increases greater than 15%, 3 to 7 person households 
with increases about 4-5%, and large households with welfare losses close 
to 10%. At PI' only small households have some welfare gains. 
Because the measurement of absolute inequality depends on the 
measurement unit, large increases (decreases) in the mean for small (large) 
households pushes down (up) changes in absolute inequality. 
Nevertheless, except for 1 or 3 person households, all subgroups have an 
improvement in absolute inequality. Consequently, welfare changes 
follow the same pattern as in the relative case at both P2 and PI' 
4. Pooling these subgroups into a single population requires value 
judgements to make welfare comparisons across subgroups. When we 
control the ethical weight to be given to household size by parameters e 
and A. in the relative and the absolute case, respectively, we find that 
although cross section estimates are affected in a non linear manner, 
aggregate welfare trends do not depend much on such parametrisations. 
However, in the absolute case, welfare change increases slightly with A.; 
this, together with the variation induced by changes in the aversion to 
inequality parameter, opens up the range of variation of our results. 
Nevertheless, when we recognize that children might very well be 
given smaller weights than adults, we find that counting a child at 75, 50, 
or 25% of an adult has an equalising effect at the cross section level but a 
small impact on welfare comparisons. 
5. At an intermediate value of e and at prices P2' there has been a 
mean improvement at least as large as 2%, an improvement in relative 
equality at most equal to 5.5%, and an improvement in real welfare of 
about 7%. At prices PI' there has been a loss in real mean at least as large as 
3.5%, an improvement in equality at least as large as 5%, and a negligible 
improvement in real welfare at most equal to 1.5%. 
Improvements in absolute inequality are larger the smaller the 
aversion to inequality parameter y. At P2 there has been an increase in real 
welfare of about 3.5-10.0%, depending on the choice of A. and y. Between 
2.0-6.5% of such an increase should be attributed to an improvement in 
absolute inequality, and the rest to a slight improvement in the mean. At 
PI' the estimates for the change in real welfare vary from a decrease of 
about 3.5% to an improvement of 2%, depending on A. and y. This is the 
result of a relatively large loss in the mean in the range 4.5-8.0%, partially 
offset by an improvement in absolute inequality of 1.0-9.0%. 
To facilitate graphical illustration, consider an economy with only 
two households: the rich and the poor. In Figure 6 we first compare the 
original distribution in situation 2, x2' to the 1973-74 distribution at prices 
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P2' Y12· There is a gain in the mean -all distributions on BB lie above those 
in CC- and an improvement in relative inequality, represented by the shift 
from ORl2 to OR2. The improvement in absolute inequality is captured by 
the move from A l2 to A2. Similarly, at PI we compare Y21 to Xl. There is a 
loss in the mean -B'B' is now below C'C'- but an improvement in both 
relative and absolute inequality -from ORI to OR21 and from Al to A 2l , 
respectively. 
6. If one applies the same inflation rate to all households in 
situation 1, estimates of welfare change are similar to those registered at P2 
with household specific price indices. However, most of the change is 
attributed to an increase in the mean. This missperception is to be expected 
in a period in which relative prices have evolved so as to cause a larger 
reduction in the standard of living of the rich, relative to the poor, hereby 
improving real inequality beyond the improvement in money inequality. 
In Figure 6, Xl becomes xl .... The change in the mean from DD to 
BB is larger than before, but the improvement in relative inequality, 
which now coincides with the change in money inequality, is represented 
by the shift from ORI to OR2. The distributional role of price changes, 
which causes the move from ORl2 to ORI, is omitted in this account. 
7. Given the fact that larger households do worse than smaller 
ones, welfare changes suffer a downward shift when in the domain of the 
social evaluation functions each household's adjusted expenditure is 
weighted by household size. This is the case at both PI and P2 in the 
relative and the absolute approach. 
8. From a quantitative point of view, choosing PI or P2 to express 
aggregate welfare change in real terms causes a larger impact than 
counting or not children differently from adults, giving a large or no 
weight to household size, weighting or not household expenditure by 
household size in the domain of the social evaluation function, or even 
choosing a relative or an absolute notion of inequality. 
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NOTES 
(1) See, for instance, Amiel and Cowell (1992), Harrison and Seidl 
(1991), and Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1994). 
(2) See, for instance, Muellbauer (l974a), Roberts (1980), and 
Blackorby, Laisney and Schmachtenberg (1992). 
(3) Contrast this position with Glewwe (1991)'s discussion of an 
example in which a regressive transfer in unadjusted incomes caused an 
increase in the mean of the adjusted distribution after the transfer, altering 
the relative share of everyone and giving rise to an improvement in the 
inequality of adjusted incomes. The paradoxical aspect of this example 
vanishes if we stick to transfers that preserve the total of adjusted incomes, 
whatever the consequences for the distribution of unadjusted incomes. 
(4) The AKS index, which is a relative index of (in)equality if and 
only if W is homothetic, is named after Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1976a) and 
Sen (1973). The KBD index, which is an absolute index if and only if W is 
translatable, is named after Kolm (1976b) and Blackorby and Donaldson 
(1980). 
(5) See Lewbel (1989) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1989). 
(6) This is the weighting scheme recommended by Dazinger and 
Taussig (1979) and Cowell (1984), and used by the present author in Ruiz-
Castillo (1993). 
(7) This is of course a measure of private consumption of goods 
and services, which does not include neither leisure nor the impact of the 
public sector via taxes or publicly provided goods and services. The 
possible effect on the standard of living of asset ownership or liquidity 
constraints will be absent also from the analysis. 
(8) For a discussion see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Ruiz-
Castillo (1991), and Coulter et al. (1992a). Other approaches are not 
convincing either, and do not generate robust empirical results, as 
documented in Buhmann et al. (1988) and Coulter et al. (1992a). 
(9) Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), Bourguinon (1989) and 
Jenkins and Lambert (1992) have developed stochastic dominance criteria 
which, coupled with relatively weak assumptions on the relationship 
between income and needs, permit an incomplete ordering of income 
distributions for a heterogeneous population. However, social welfare is 
only a weighted sum of welfare within each of the subgroups of the 
relevant partition. 
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(10) In the relative case, this condition is called Engel Equivalence 
Exactness in Blackorby and Donaldson (1989). 
(11) In this respect, see the interchange between Banks and 
Johnson (1993) and Jenkins and Cowell (1993), as well as the empirical 
literature quoted there. 
(12) In the only previous empirical study we know of on absolute 
inequality, Blackorby, Donaldson and Auersperg (1981) choose values of 'Y 
equal to 5.10-6, 5.10-5, 10-4, and 5.10-4 for distributions expressed in 
Canadian dollars. 
(13) For 'Y =10-4and A. =90.000, welfare at Y12 is barely positive (see 
Table 4). Welfare change at P2 and that A. value causes a large discontinuity 
which, to avoid distorsions, has not been represented in Figure 3. 
(14) See, for instance, Jenkins (1991). 
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Figure 3. Changes in the mean, absolute inequality and welfare as a function 
of gamma, lambda and base prices 
TABLE S. Change in real welfare in terms of a change in the mean and a change in 
absolute inequality at 'Y = 5 . 10-6, in percentages. 
UNWEIGHTED DISTRIBUTIONS 
At P2 
A
°
15,000 30,000 45,000 60,000 75,000 90,000 OECD 
J1P.2' 2.46 2.69 2.95 3.29 3.72 4.33 5.24 4.88 
J1Ey2' 6.18 6.26 6.38 6.56 6.80 7.14 7.60 2.07 
J1Wy2' 8.65 8.95 9.34 9.84 10.52 11.46 12.83 6.95 
At PI 
A 
° 
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 OECD 
J1p' t 
J1Eyl ' 
1 ·5.52 -5.77 -6.07 -6.43 -6.86 ·7.39 -8.06 -2.22 
5.89 6.06 6.26 6.51 6.83 7.23 7.75 2.01 
J1Woylt 0.37 0.28 0.18 0.08 -0.04 -0.17 -0.31 -0.22 
>.. 
° 
15,000 30,000 45,000 60,000 75,000 90,000 OECD 
J1p..t 7.42 7.90 8.49 9.25 10.26 11.68 13.85 8.52 
J1E./ 0.98 0.78 0.55 0.25 -0.14 -0.72 -1.67 -0.79 
J1W/ 8.40 8.68 9.04 9.50 10.12 10.96 12.18 7.73 
WEIGHTED DISTRIBUTIONS BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
At P2 
A 
° 
15,000 30,000 45,000 60,000 75,000 90,000 
J1P.2' -0.89 -0.79 -0.69 -0.57 -0.43 ·0.24 0.01 
J1Ey1' 7.36 7.59 7.90 8.30 8.84 9.58 10.70 
J1W..2' 6.47 6.80 7.21 7.74 8.41 9.34 10.71 
A
°
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 
J1P.I' -7.73 -8.17 -8.69 -9.32 -10.11 -11.11 -12.42 
J1Eyl' 6.33 6.61 6.96 7.39 7.93 8.63 9.54 
J1Wyl' -1.40 -1.55 -1.73 -1.93 -2.18 -2.48 -2.87 
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TABLE 7. Change in the mean, absolute inequality and real welfare in the partition 
by household size. In percentages relative to WiYlOm), m=I,2, ... ,9+, Po 
= 1'2 and Po = PI' 
At D, At D. 
Num. of 
persons ..1W
t
,2= ..1P.t,2 + ..1E',..2 ..1W' = ,..1 ..1P.',1 + ..1Et 'l 
'Y = 5 • 10-7 
1 15.3 14.2 -1.2 7.2 6.6 0.6 
2 8.6 6.8 1.9 1.4 0.6 0.8 
3 3.2 . 2.5 0.7 -3.0 -3.5 0.5 
4 3.5 2.4 1.1 -3.0 -3.6 0.6 
5 2.2 0.1 2.1 -4.8 -5.8 1.0 
6 0.9 -2.2 3.1 -5.9 -7.5 1.6 
7 2.2 -0.1 2.3 -5.0 -6.1 1.1 
8 -6.8 -9.4 2.6 -12.9 -14.1 1.2 
9+ -9.2 -14.6 5.4 -19 1 -21.1 2.0 
'Y = 5 . 10-6 
1 19.8 20.1 -0.3 10.6 7.8 2.8 
2 13.2 9.8 3.4 4.9 0.7 4.3 
3 3.6 3.5 0.1 -1.5 -4.1 2.6 
4 6.9 3.4 3.6 -0.8 -4.2 3.4 
5 5.6 0.2 5.4 -1.5 -6.9 5.4 
6 7.4 -3.3 10.8 -2.1 -9.0 6.9 
7 5.1 -0.2 5.3 -1.3 -7.6 6.2 
8 -6.7 -14.9 8.1 -10.7 -17.8 7.1 
9+ -5.7 -24.2 ]8.4 -13.6 -27.7 14.0 
'Y = 1 • 10-5 
1 20.2 24.1 -3.9 12.0 8.7 3.3 
2 14.3 12.1 2.2 6.6 0.8 5.8 
3 2.3 4.4 -2.1 -1.0 -4.5 3.5 
4 8.6 4.2 4.4 0.5 -4.8 5.3 
5 5.1 0.2 4.9 -0.1 -7.8 7.7 
6 8.4 -4.3 12.7 0.4 -10.3 10.7 
7 2.3 -0.3 2.6 0.1 -8.7 8.8 
8 -11.3 -19.2 7.9 -10.3 -20.7 10.4 
9+ -104 -32.2 21.8 -11.2 -':\2.7 21'\ 
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